


This humanitarian profile was prepared under the auspices of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Libya. It is to inform humanitarian programming of the UN, INGOs and partners in Libya.

Executive Summary

Libya continues to face a protracted humanitarian situation in 2025, characterized by political divisions, localized insecurity, and economic instability underpinned by the ongoing political crisis, foreign interference, and currency fluctuations. Approximately 787,090 people, including internally displaced persons (IDPs), migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, remain in need of assistance.¹



In 2023, the 2023 Storm Daniel disaster marked a turning point, exposing the country's vulnerability to climate-related shocks and triggering one of the largest flood-induced displacement crises in recent history. This catastrophe, along with broader climate change trends, revealed systemic weaknesses in public infrastructure and underscored the need for investment in climate-resilient systems and disaster risk reduction efforts.²

The overall security situation remains precarious with localized spikes of violence, political uncertainty, a media sector prone to misinformation and hate speech, and fragmentation of institutions disrupting access to services and undermining recovery efforts. The economy remains unstable, with the Libyan dinar devalued by 13.3% in April 2025 and public debt projected to exceed 330 billion Libyan dinars by the end of the year.³ Service delivery, particularly in electricity, health, and water systems, remains inconsistent.

As of August 2024, Libya was hosting 139,305 IDPs, including individuals displaced by both conflict and Storm Daniel. Of these, 104,262 persons were on pathways to durable solutions and the rest (35,043 individuals) remains in protracted displacement, particularly in Murzuq, Tawergha, and Derna, due to damaged infrastructure, land disputes, and security concerns.⁴

Libya hosts an estimated 334,000 refugees and asylum seekers are present in Libya, including over 313,000 Sudanese arrivals since April 2023.^{5 6} Women and children constitute approximately 60% of this population.⁶ Roughly 70% of this population lacks valid residency documentation, increasing protection risks. Needs assessments conducted by UNHCR and partners in 2024 across 76 locations indicate gaps

1. PIN figure based on IOM DTM Round 56 (May 2025), IOM IDP Report (Aug 2024), and UNHCR data (May 2025). It includes 35,043 protracted IDPs, 334,449 refugees/asylum seekers, and 417,597 non-Sudanese migrants (70% of 596,568, out of 858,604 total migrants). Sudanese nationals are counted under the refugee caseload to avoid duplication, in line with the Sudan RRP.

2. IOM, Libya Country Response Plan 2025–2026.

3. Central Bank of Libya Statement, April 2025

4. IOM DTM Libya IDP Report, August 2024

5. UNHCR, Estimated REF-ASR Libya dataset, April 2025

6. UNHCR, Sudanese Refugees and Asylum-Seekers in Libya – Core Update, May 2025

in access to shelter, health services, education, and documentation.⁷

The total number of migrants in Libya is estimated at 858,604 as of May 2025, according to IOM's DTM Round 56. (including all foreign nationals, such as refugees and asylum seekers). While many are employed informally in different sectors, most lack work permits and face high levels of vulnerability. Detention, unsafe working conditions, exposure to violence, abuses and exploitation and limited access to services remain major concerns, especially for women (11%) and unaccompanied children (3%) of the migrant population.

Humanitarian access has further deteriorated in 2025. Administrative procedures remain unpredictable, and access to specific areas—including detention centres and disembarkation points—remains restricted. In March 2025, ten INGOs received stop-work orders from security authorities in West Libya, impacting service delivery. Field staff continue to report instances of

interference, detention, and denial of access in various locations. The humanitarian coordination structure in Libya has shifted toward a Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) Nexus approach, aligning with the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) 2023–2026. The HDP Nexus Advisory Group, chaired by the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, ensures coordination across humanitarian, development, and peace efforts. Area Coordination Groups (ACG), co-chaired by OCHA and UNDP, facilitate operations across regions, ensuring alignment between humanitarian and development planning. For example, the ACGs were instrumental in coordinating emergency support to flood-affected communities in several parts of Libya in 2024 (for more detailed information, see Annex I).

Sustained engagement with authorities, predictable access procedures, and flexible funding remain essential to ensure continuity of humanitarian assistance. Partners will continue to respond to immediate needs while supporting community resilience and progress toward longer-term recovery.



7. UNHCR Protection Monitoring Report, November 2024

1. Context and Conflict Analysis

Libya remains a country facing complex and interlinked humanitarian challenges, shaped by political divisions, localized tensions, economic hardship, and environmental shocks. While displacement figures remain relatively stable, increasing fragilities and growing volatility driven by an escalating political and security situation continue to disrupt services and strain coping capacities in affected areas. Understanding this evolving context is critical for shaping a well-informed and coordinated humanitarian response.

Political Fragmentation and Security Dynamics:

Following the 2011 revolution and subsequent civil wars, Libya remains divided between competing authorities, leading to the establishment of parallel institutions and overlapping claims of legitimacy.⁸ The internationally recognized Government of National Unity (GNU), based in Tripoli, controls western Libya. In the east, the Government of National Stability (GNS), appointed by the House of Representatives (HoR), holds authority and is aligned with the Libyan National Army (LNA). This divide has resulted in a fragmented security landscape, with numerous militias and armed groups exerting significant influence, often surpassing that of official institutions. Foreign interventions have further entrenched these divisions, with various external factors supporting different factions, thereby sustaining a precarious balance of power. Elections planned for December 2021 were postponed, contributing to ongoing political uncertainty. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) is focusing on mediating between factions to pave the way for elections and political reconciliation.

Despite the signing of a ceasefire agreement in October 2020, the security situation remains volatile. Sporadic armed clashes continue to erupt, particularly in urban centres where communal conflicts and criminal networks contribute to intermittent insecurity.

Human rights abuses by armed groups, including arbitrary detention, abductions, and extortion, are frequently reported, fostering a pervasive climate of fear among the civilian population.⁹ The proliferation of autonomous armed groups and the absence of a unified national military force have severely impeded efforts toward stabilization and reconciliation.

Armed groups, though nominally under government control, retain independent agendas and dominate local territories and access corridors. During the first half of 2025, skirmishes and military movements around Tripoli further illustrated the fragile security environment.¹⁰

Economic Crisis and Public Services:

The protracted conflict has had devastating economic consequences. The oil sector, which is the backbone of Libya's economy, has been particularly affected, with frequent blockades and damage to infrastructure leading to fluctuating production levels. This instability has resulted in decreased government revenues, limiting the state's ability to provide essential public services.

In April 2025, the Central Bank of Libya announced a 13.3% devaluation of the Libyan dinar, setting the exchange rate at 5.5677 to the U.S. dollar.¹¹ This decision reflects ongoing economic instability, with public debt reaching 270 billion Libyan dinars and projections indicating it may exceed 330 billion Libyan dinars by the end of the year due to the absence of a unified budget. The devaluation aims to address the disparity between the official and black-market exchange rates, the latter being significantly higher, indicating a lack of confidence in the national currency.

Despite temporary market stabilization as reflected in WFP's February 2025 market monitoring, regional disparities remain stark. The Minimum Expenditure

8. United Nations Security Council Report, 2024

9. UNSMIL Human Rights Report, October 2023

10. United Nations Security Council, Ongoing Military Build-Up, Economic Crisis in Libya Reignite Concerns, April 2025, <https://press.un.org/en/2025/sc16045.doc.htm>

11. Central Bank of Libya Statement, April 2025 – <http://cbl.gov.ly>

Basket (MEB) reached 1,084.60 LYD in Murzuq and 1,055.24 LYD in Al Kufra - the highest nationwide - due to refugee influxes and logistical constraints. In contrast, the MEB in Tripoli in the western region was significantly lower, estimated at 912 LYD, illustrating regional differences in household vulnerability. Households across Libya increasingly rely on negative coping strategies, including asset sales, meal skipping, child labor, and increased debt.¹²

Public services have deteriorated correspondingly. Frequent electricity outages and compromised water supply systems have exacerbated the humanitarian situation. The health sector is under significant strain, with a Public Health Situation Analysis in March 2025 highlighting rising health issues among refugees and vulnerable populations, including children, women, and the elderly with chronic illnesses.¹³ These economic and infrastructural challenges have led to increased poverty and inequality, further impeding the country's progress toward sustainable development.

Libya's public services are ill-equipped to respond to demographic pressures. In health, 75% of migrants report limited or no access to care, with women disproportionately affected.¹⁴ In education, an estimated 43% of Sudanese refugee children remain out of school due to legal, financial, or logistical barriers.¹⁵ WASH services are severely compromised by deteriorating infrastructure, particularly in eastern and southern regions. Many facilities operate without safe sanitation systems, and water sources are increasingly contaminated, heightening risks of waterborne disease.¹⁶

Social and Community Dynamics:

The protracted conflict and political fragmentation have deeply affected Libya's social fabric. Communities remain divided along tribal, regional, and ideological lines, leading to tensions and mistrust that are exacerbated by a regular flow of misinformation, disinformation and hate speech in broadcast and social media.¹⁷ In March 2025, ten international aid organizations operating in West Libya received stop-work orders from security authorities, accused of violating national laws by supporting migrants and failing to comply with local regulations. These orders followed a period of high-profile disinformation and hate speech against migrants¹⁸ and have negatively affected humanitarian efforts. This action impacts vulnerable populations, particularly migrants and internally displaced persons, who rely heavily on international assistance. Moreover, the displacement crisis continues to be a pressing issue as the influx of refugees and migrants is overstressing already strained resources and infrastructure and exacerbating social tensions. The 2025 Libyan chapter of the Sudan Refugee Regional Response Plan targets 446,000 individuals and requires \$106 million in funding, highlighting the scale of humanitarian needs.¹⁹

Libya's current state is one of cautious calm but persistent fragility. The interplay of political fragmentation, economic hardship, and social tensions creates a complex landscape that necessitates a nuanced and conflict-sensitive approach to humanitarian intervention. Addressing the root causes of instability, fostering inclusive governance, and building resilience against economic and social shocks are imperative for sustainable peace and development in Libya.

2. Methodology for Developing the Humanitarian Profile

12. World Food Programme (WFP), Libya Market Price Monitoring – February 2025. <https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/wfp-libya-market-price-monitoring-february-2025>

13. WHO Libya Health Snapshot, March 2025 – <https://www.who.int/emergencies>

14. International Organization for Migration (IOM), Migrant Report Round 55, 2025. https://dtm.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1461/files/reports/DTM_Libya_R55_Migrant_Report_Final.pdf

15. Africanews, Sudanese Refugee Children Find Hope in Libyan School, April 2025. <https://www.africanews.com/2025/04/21/sudanese-refugee-children-find-hope-in-libyan-school/>

16. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), Libya: Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Reports, 2025. <https://response.reliefweb.int/fr/libya/water-sanitation-hygiene/reports>

17. UNSMIL. (13 March 2025). Statement by the United Nations in Libya warns against misinformation and hate speech. <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/statement-united-nations-libya-warns-against-misinformation-and-hate-speech>

18. UNSMIL Human Rights Report, April 2025

19. UNHCR Sudan Refugee Response Plan – Libya Chapter, 2025 – <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/sudan>

The Humanitarian Profile for Libya 2025 is based on a structured review of existing secondary data and publicly available reports. The analysis draws primarily on verified figures produced by humanitarian partners, including the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) and UNHCR, which serve as the main sources of data on IDPs, migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers. Additional references include available situation updates and previously published materials from UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, and relevant national institutions, including municipal councils and ministries.

Figures reflect the most recent data available as of May 2025. While no new field assessments or data collection activities were conducted for this profile, where possible, triangulation of data across multiple sources was undertaken to ensure internal consistency and analytical coherence. The analysis remains subject to the inherent limitations of secondary data, including uneven coverage in hard-to-reach areas, variations in reporting methodologies, and limited registration of certain population groups. The Humanitarian Profile was compiled by OCHA Libya's Humanitarian Advisory Team (HAT), with review and input from selected humanitarian partners to ensure contextual accuracy.


Figures reflect the most recent data available as of May 2025. While no new field assessments or data collection activities were conducted for this profile, where possible, triangulation of data across multiple sources was undertaken to ensure internal consistency and analytical coherence. The analysis remains subject to the inherent limitations of secondary data, including uneven coverage in hard-to-reach areas, variations in reporting methodologies, and limited registration of

3. Humanitarian Operational Environment

3.1 Affected Populations:

As of May 2025, there are approximately 787,090 people in need of humanitarian assistance in Libya²⁰, out of a total of 1,332,358 people of concern (139,305 IDPs, 334,449 refugees and asylum seekers, and 858,604 migrants). The number of people in need reflects those facing severe unmet humanitarian needs (Joint Intersectoral Analysis Framework severity level 3 or above) in the three main groups, including IDPs, refugees and asylum seekers, and migrants.

Internally displaced persons (IDPs)



As of August 2024, Libya had 139,305 IDPs, of whom 104,262 individuals (74,412 due to the conflicts and 29,850 by Storm Daniel) were on pathways to durable solutions. The remaining 35,043 IDPs continue to experience long-term displacement due to housing shortages, infrastructure damage, land disputes, and access to services. They are mainly concentrated in Murzuq, Tawergha, Tripoli, Benghazi, Sirte, and Derna, where security concerns, lack of reconstruction, and legal barriers hinder return and reintegration. Tribal tensions in Murzuq and property disputes in Tawergha remain major obstacles to return, contributing to continued displacement.

20. The PIN figure of 787,090 is based on IOM DTM Round 56 (May 2025), UNHCR data (May 2025), and IOM IDP Report (August 2024). It includes 35,043 protracted IDPs, 334,449 refugees and asylum seekers, and 417,598 non-Sudanese migrants. Sudanese nationals are included under the refugee caseload to avoid duplication, in line with the Sudan RRP. The 104,262 IDPs on pathways to durable solutions are excluded, as they are no longer considered in immediate humanitarian need.



Conflict-Displaced Population:

107,203 IDPs, with **74,412 (70%)** on pathways to durable solutions.



Storm Daniel-Displaced Population:

32,102 IDPs, with **29,850 (93%)** on pathways to durable solutions. **3%** remain in severely damaged buildings, and **1%** live in unsustainable shelter situations **87%** households have access to public services, but **4%** report impaired access, and **8%** experience unpredictable disruptions



The number of IDPs in protracted displacement decreased from **50,000** (August 2023) to **35,043** (August 2024).

Protracted Displacement: While some displacement situations are resolving, 35,043 IDPs remain in protracted displacement. These figures refer only to IDPs who are not on pathways to durable solutions. According to IOM DTM (August 2024), eastern Libya hosts 11,380 IDPs in protracted displacement, with cases spread across seven Mantika, including Al Jabal Al Akhdar, Alkufra, Almarj, Benghazi (5,076), Derna (2,192), Ejdabia, and Tobruk. Western Libya accounts for 12,399 IDPs, concentrated in Misrata (2,430), Tripoli (2,758), Almageb (1,078), and Zwara (430). Southern Libya accounts for 11,264 IDPs, with Ghat (1,813), Murzuq (3,247), and Ubari (2,909) as key locations.

Displacement is primarily linked to past conflict-related movements (19,205 IDPs), especially from Benghazi (5,076) and Sirte (3,060), with most individuals displaced since 2019 or earlier. While Storm Daniel displaced 32,102 individuals, nearly all have transitioned to solutions pathways. Only about 2,252 flood-displaced IDPs remain without durable solutions and are included in the protracted caseload.²¹ According to the Storm Daniel IDP Update (Sep 2024), 3% of the flood-induced IDPs reside in damaged buildings, and 1% live in unsustainable shelter conditions, placing them at risk of secondary displacement. The same assessment found that access to services was rather unpredictable for 8%

of the flood-affected IDPs, while most had consistent access. In terms of financial support, 79% of the flood-induced IDPs had received some form of assistance; however, in 42% of the assessed locations, this support covered less than half of household needs, highlighting persistent vulnerability

Pathways to Durable Solutions: Efforts to resolve internal displacement in Libya have continued under the Durable Solutions Roadmap with the Government of National Unity, the Durable Solutions Strategy, and the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF, 2023-2026). These coordinated efforts, alongside Libya's relative but uncertain stability since the 2020 ceasefire agreement, have contributed to the reduction in the number of IDPs while advancing voluntary returns, local integration, and relocation through targeted policies and joint government-UN initiatives.²²

The return process continues to advance, particularly in Murzuq and Tawergha, though challenges persist. In Tawergha, around 45% of the displaced population had returned by mid-2022 following reconciliation efforts and basic service rehabilitation. Returns continue in phases, but many families remain displaced due to infrastructure gaps and unresolved property disputes.

21. IOM DTM Libya IDP Report, August 2024

22. UNSMIL Ceasefire Monitoring Report, 2020–2024

In Murzuq, local reconciliation efforts and community dialogues led to the 2024 Murzuq Local Peacebuilding and Development Plan, prioritizing housing, services, and livelihoods. Implementation is partial. While the Libyan Reconstruction Fund has rehabilitated 1,500 houses and plans to support returns, many Murzuq IDPs still receive rent assistance.

While some government-led compensation and reconstruction programs have been introduced, their current scale in 2025 is unclear. Security concerns, political instability, and limited infrastructure remain key challenges to full reintegration.

At the same time, many IDPs have settled in host communities such as Benghazi, Tripoli, Misrata, and Ubari, or relocated to other urban centres like Ajdabiya, Al Beyda, and Sebha, benefiting from expanded social protection mechanisms. Under the Solutions Roadmap, efforts are ongoing to integrate IDPs into Libya's Social Protection Strategy (SPS), however, the extent of implementation and national coverage remains limited and may vary by location. Despite these


efforts, key challenges persist, particularly in securing adequate housing and sustainable livelihoods. Many returnees and relocated IDPs struggle with damaged homes, rising rent prices, and limited job opportunities, especially in municipalities affected by conflict or economic decline. To address these gaps the Roadmap prioritizes area-based action plans, with the Murzuq Local Peacebuilding and Development Plan finalized, while the Tawergha plan is expected by mid-2025 to further support their integration and stability.

To ensure a structured and coordinated approach, the Government-UN Task Force and quarterly Inter-Ministerial Meetings have played a critical role in monitoring progress, addressing challenges, and mobilizing resources. These platforms have facilitated policy alignment, ensured the effective implementation of the Solutions Roadmap, and enabled joint decision-making to advance durable solutions.

Refugees and Asylum seekers

As of May 2025, Libya hosts an estimated 334,000 refugees and asylum seekers, of whom 91,427 are registered with UNHCR²³. The Sudanese refugee crisis alone has led to the arrival of approximately 313,000 Sudanese refugees into Libya since April 2023, primarily entering through Al Kufra. Among them, 50,542 individuals were registered post-conflict, bringing the total number of Sudanese registered with UNHCR in Tripoli to 70,394.²⁴

Libyan authorities in Al Kufra reported issuing 164,500 health certificates as of March 2025, and it is estimated that approximately 245,000 Sudanese entered Libya via Al Kufra between January 2024 and March 2025. Due to the irregular nature of entry, the



ad hoc data shared by local authorities, and the vast remote land borders with Sudan, Egypt, and Chad, it remains challenging to establish an exact number of Sudanese refugees.

23. UNHCR, Libya Operational Update – March 2025

24. UNHCR, Sudanese Refugees and Asylum-Seekers in Libya – Core Data as of March 2025

Since the outbreak of the war in Sudan in April 2023, there has been a steady flow of Sudanese refugees arriving in Libya, which increased significantly at the beginning of 2024, resulting in Libya being included in the Sudan Regional Refugee Response Plan in July 2024. The response is coordinated by UNHCR through an interagency task force structure, including seven thematic task forces (Protection, Shelter & NFI, Food Security, WASH, Health & Nutrition, Education, and Access). An Information Management (IM) Task Force supports data collection and management.

Sudanese nationals now account for approximately 76% of registered refugees, followed by Syrians (10%), Eritreans (8%), and smaller groups from Palestine, Somalia, Ethiopia, and others. These populations are primarily concentrated in Tripoli, Misrata, Al Kufra, Benghazi, Ejdabia, Azzawi, and parts of Al Qatroun and Sebha, although many live in informal urban settings with limited access to services²⁵.

More than 70% of refugees report lacking valid residency documents, increasing their risk of arrest, eviction, and inability to access basic services. Female-headed households face disproportionate protection risks, including gender-based violence (GBV) and economic vulnerability. Approximately 27% of school-aged refugee children remain out of school due to barriers such as affordability, documentation, and language.²⁵

UNHCR and partners conducted needs assessments in 76 locations in 2024, identifying critical gaps in documentation, shelter, food access, healthcare, and mental health services. These needs are especially acute outside Tripoli, where humanitarian access remains limited.²⁶

In 2024, 1,500 refugees departed Libya via humanitarian pathways: 564 to Rwanda through the Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM), 355 to Italy, and 581 through third-country resettlement and complementary pathways to destinations such as Canada, Norway, and the Netherlands²⁷. These efforts remain essential but fall far short of addressing the scale of need.

To address the evolving situation, the 2025 Sudan Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRP) for Libya targets 446,000 individuals and calls for USD 106 million to support protection, health, shelter, education, and livelihoods interventions²⁸.

25. UNHCR, Libya Operational Update – March 2025.

26. UNHCR Protection Monitoring Report, November 2024

27. UNHCR Resettlement and Humanitarian Pathways Update, December 2024.

28. Sudan Regional Refugee Response Plan – Libya Country Chapter, 2025

Migrants

As of early 2025, an estimated, 858,604 migrants reside in Libya.²⁹ This marks a slight increase from roughly 761,000 at end-2023. However, despite recent growth, the current migrant population is still about 68% lower than pre-2011 levels (Libya hosted well over 2.5 million migrant workers before the 2011 crisis).


Migrants in Libya come from 46 different nationalities, mainly from neighbouring African countries.

The total number of migrants includes all non-Libyan nationals, including Sudanese. However, in this profile, Sudanese nationals are analyzed under the Refugees and Asylum Seekers section, in line with the Sudan Regional Refugee Response Plan (SRRP) and to prevent duplication. They are therefore not included in the breakdown of top migrant nationalities or in the sectoral analysis that follows.³⁰

The top nationalities among the migrant population (excluding Sudanese) are Nigerian (22%), Egyptian (20%), Chadian (10%), and Nigerian (3%). The demographic composition includes 78 % adult males, 11 % adult females, and 11 % children, among whom 4% are unaccompanied minors.²⁹

Migrants engage primarily in informal employment across sectors such as construction, agriculture, and domestic work. While 78% of adult male migrants are employed, only 34% of adult female migrant's report having a job. The following breakdown reflects the subset of employed migrants only, not the total migrant population. Among employed men, nearly half work in the construction sector, while most employed women (75%) serve as cleaners or domestic workers. Female migrants are also present in healthcare (5%) and manufacturing (5%). Percentages reflect only the employed subgroup.²⁹

The unemployment rate remains at 21% - 25%. Financial hardship is widespread with 63% of migrants reporting that they struggling to meet basic needs,



and even among the employed, of whom 55% face economic challenges.

Working conditions are often unsafe or exploitative. Common risks include lack of job security (52%), being underpaid (47%), and verbal abuse (40%). Among those in the construction sector, a half (48%) reported unsafe working environments. Meanwhile, 54% of female migrants without work permits are unemployed.

Living conditions vary: 71% of migrants rent accommodation, often informally. About 6% live in their workplace, and a small minority (32%) live in informal shelters. Lack of legal documentation is widespread 91% do not possess work permits, and 27% reported difficulty obtaining identity documents. Without documentation, migrants face risks of exploitation, detention, or eviction; 14% of female migrants and 4% of males reported being evicted or threatened with eviction.

Access to basic services is severely limited. About 75% of migrants report limited or no access to healthcare, and affordability is the main barrier. Female migrants face greater access issues than males (28% vs 15%). Water scarcity remains a critical concern with 37% of unemployed migrants reporting inadequate access to safe drinking water.

Access to education for migrant children is extremely low. While only 14% of migrants reported having

29. IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), Libya – Round 56, (January–February 2025).

30. Sudanese nationals represent approximately 31% of the total migrant population (262,036 individuals), according to IOM DTM Round 56. While included in the overall migrant figure, they are analyzed under the refugee caseload in line with the Sudan Regional Refugee Response Plan (SRRP).

children in Libya, over half of them 58% had no access to education. Among sub-Saharan migrant children, 78% lack access to schooling due to financial constraints, documentation issues, and language barriers.

Between 7,000 and 10,000 migrants, roughly 1.2% of the total number, are held in detention centers, mainly in western Libya. These centers are overcrowded, with inadequate sanitation, healthcare, and nutrition, presenting grave protection risk. Over 91 % of all migrants in Libya lack work permits, with significantly lower possession rates among migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa.²⁹

3.2 Humanitarian Access Impediments

Humanitarian access across Libya continues to be constrained by a combination of bureaucratic impediments, movement restrictions, insecurity, and logistical challenges. These constraints are not uniform and vary by geographical region, type of actor, and nature of the humanitarian activity. As of April 2025, humanitarian partners report that access constraints have increased in severity and frequency compared to previous years, particularly due to administrative unpredictability and political sensitivities.³¹

Bureaucratic and Administrative Constraints

Humanitarian actors face persistent delays in obtaining movement authorizations, both from GNU in the west and the GNS in the east. All movements outside of Tripoli and Benghazi require prior notification and multi-layered approvals from local, security, and military entities. In both regions, procedures often lack transparency, are inconsistently applied, and are subject to frequent changes without formal communication.

In March 2025, the Internal Security Agency (ISA) in western Libya issued a stop-work order to ten INGOs, citing alleged non-compliance with Libyan laws and norms, support for irregular migration and resettlement, and financial misconduct. The order

was not accompanied by a confirmed legal basis from the Attorney-General.³² This action resulted in the immediate cessation of activities for affected partners, disrupted service delivery, and increased uncertainty for other actors. The issuance of visas and residency renewals for international staff remains inconsistent, with short-notice rejections affecting operational continuity.

Movement Restrictions and Denial of Access

Access to specific locations remains restricted due to sensitivity, security risk, or administrative decisions. Humanitarian organizations report sustained denial of access to detention centres and disembarkation points along the western coastal region. Despite sustained advocacy, access to monitor conditions or provide assistance at these sites remains extremely limited.

In eastern Libya, access to Derna was temporarily suspended in late 2023 following security-related incidents.³³ Although access to the city has gradually resumed, it remains subject to additional coordination with military entities. Additional access risks stem from explosive remnants of war (ERW), especially in southern Tripoli, Benghazi's outskirts, and parts of Sirte and Derna.³⁴

Access to Al-Kufra remains severely constrained due to a combination of insecurity, remoteness, and administrative hurdles. The area is controlled by LNA, and movement into and within Al-Kufra requires negotiation with the East-based authorities, often resulting in delays or denials. The deteriorating condition of roads and limited availability of commercial transport further restrict humanitarian operations, particularly during the summer months. In addition, the absence of a consistent UN or INGO presence on the ground complicates needs assessments, monitoring, and sustained service delivery.

31. OCHA Libya Access Snapshot Q1–Q4, 2024

32. UNSMIL Human Rights Report, April 2025

33. Security Council Report on Libya, December 2023

34. UNMAS. Libya Programme Summary. <https://www.unmas.org/en/programmes/libya>

Interference in Humanitarian Activities

Humanitarian personnel, particularly national staff, have reported incidents of intimidation, temporary detention, and document verification at checkpoints. While most missions proceed without interference once authorized, localized application of unofficial procedures and lack of communication between central and field-level authorities remain common. In several cases, security actors disrupted coordination meetings or training workshops, raising protection concerns and restraining operational space.

Physical Constraints and Logistical Limitations

Physical access remains a challenge, particularly in remote or underserved locations in the south and southeast. Poor road infrastructure, seasonal weather conditions, and long travel distances hinder regular service delivery to areas such as Ghat, Murzuq, Qatroun, and Al Kufra. In some cases, humanitarian actors rely on air transport to reach deep-field locations, which increases operational costs and limits cargo volumes.

In addition to infrastructure challenges, access to essential supplies is constrained by the limited availability of qualified suppliers, particularly for medications and medical equipment. Most recognized suppliers are based in Tripoli, making procurement and delivery to remote locations logistically complex and time-consuming. This further compounds the cost and delays associated with delivering life-saving assistance to hard-to-reach areas.

Mitigation Measures and Advocacy Efforts


Humanitarian actors are continuously working to mitigate these impediments. High-level advocacy with Libyan authorities is ongoing to streamline bureaucracy. For example, OCHA and the UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator have negotiated for a unified notification system so that agencies don't have to seek duplicative clearances from multiple offices. There has been an effort to develop clearer standard operating procedures (SOPs) for humanitarian access that the East authorities can endorse, including more transparent criteria for NGO registration and activity approvals.

In the second quarter of 2025, movement coordination for the UN and INGOs transitioned back to individual agencies for day-to-day interactions with relevant authorities, while the RCO, OCHA, and the Libya INGO Forum (LIF) will shift focus to strategic engagement and advocacy. These actors will work towards streamlining movement processes and potentially establishing a unified movement notification system for both UN agencies and INGOs. Strengthened coordination with the authorities (through regular access working group meetings with government counterparts), clearer and more consistent procedures set by those authorities, and continued advocacy against unwarranted restrictions or harassment are priorities for 2025. Overcoming these obstacles is critical to maintain an effective humanitarian operation, especially if new shocks occur that require rapid response.

3.3 Humanitarian Coordination Structure


Since 2023, Libya's humanitarian coordination shifted to align with development and peace efforts. The traditional Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) was replaced by the HDP Nexus Advisory Group, led by the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC). This group includes UN agencies, donors, and INGO representatives, ensuring humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding efforts complement each other. Aligned with the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework 2023–2026, the coordination structure aims to enhance synergy, linking emergency response with recovery and stabilization.

As part of the transition process, the provision of assistance for residual humanitarian needs will continue, while partners will work simultaneously to design and implement activities that build resilience of the most vulnerable populations to better withstand shocks, reducing future humanitarian needs. The OCHA HAT has been coordinating the Area-based Coordination Groups, with terms of reference to accommodate the Nexus approach.



3.4 Operational Partners

Humanitarian and development operations in Libya are supported by a wide network of operational partners, including UN agencies, INGOs, local implemented partners. These actors collectively contribute to multi-sectoral responses across the country, ensuring that essential assistance reaches people in need despite the complex operational environment.



4. Governmental Structure for Disaster/Emergency Preparedness and Response

In 2024, Libya's disaster/emergency response structure involved multiple authorities in the east and west, creating overlapping roles and coordination challenges. The Libyan government works with the UN and NGOs within these structures on humanitarian responses.

Key Libyan authorities in the east and the west

Western Libya (GNU, Tripoli-based)

- **Ministry of Local Governance (MoLG):**
Leads emergency coordination, activates municipal response plans, and liaises with humanitarian partners.
- **Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA):**
Focuses on support to IDPs and vulnerable populations; chairs coordination platforms on social protection and humanitarian assistance.
- **Municipalities & Local Crisis Committees:**
Lead local-level coordination during emergencies, register IDPs, and distribute aid.

Eastern Libya (GNS – Benghazi-based)

- **Ad-hoc Emergency/Crisis Committees:**
Established during major crises (e.g. Storm Daniel) by eastern authorities or military leadership to oversee immediate response, similar setups responded to the Sudanese influx led by UNHCR and supported by municipal authorities and relevant national counterparts.
- **Ministry of Local Governance**
Works with municipalities on disaster response but with more limited institutional capacity.
- **Ministry of Health**
Manages local medical emergency responses and health sector coordination.
- **Ministry of Interior**
Oversees civil defence operations, including rescue and security-related responses.
- **Municipalities**
Coordinate directly with humanitarian actors and implement on-the-ground relief.

Southern Libya (Mixed Governance & Local Authority Engagement)

- **Municipal Councils:**
Serve as the main coordination points for humanitarian engagement, often request aid, facilitate assessments, and oversee local response efforts.
- **Local Crisis Committees:**
Established in response to floods, displacement, or refugee influxes, these committees often coordinate directly with UN agencies and NGOs, despite lacking formal national mandates.
- **South Military Zone:**
Plays a pivotal role in facilitating humanitarian access, particularly in remote or insecure areas. The zone has supported coordinated logistics during flood emergencies and other critical situations. While it is not a humanitarian actor, its cooperation has been instrumental in enabling effective response operations.
- **Local Branches of National Ministries:**
In some cases, representatives from MoSA, and MoH are present and participate in assessments or aid coordination, but their engagement is highly dependent on local leadership and context.

5. Conclusion

As Libya continues its transition phase, the focus of humanitarian assistance activities shifts to sustaining recovery gains and addressing remaining vulnerabilities, including from those related to Storm Daniel (2023-2024) and the Sudanese refugee crisis (2024-present). Critical priorities include financial resources for the 2025 humanitarian response, which includes continued assistance for refugees, migrants, IDPs, and flood-affected populations. Sustained donor engagement and support based on the HDP Nexus approach are imperative to avert backsliding and achieve sustainable recovery.


Annexes

Annex I: OCHA Flash Floods Impact and Response– 2024

Between August and December 2024 alone, Libya experienced six (6) flood events, prompting municipalities to formally request humanitarian assistance. OCHA received 13 formal requests from municipal authorities seeking emergency support to the flood-affected communities, highlighting the ongoing fragility of Libya.

West Flood Situation – December 2024

- **Displaced families:** 667
- **Casualties:** Five fatalities reported (three civilians and two emergency workers).
- **Affected Areas:** Tarhuna, Bani Waleed, Ghiryana, Ain Zara, Qasr Akhyar, Garabolli, and Tajoura.
- **Damages:** Hospitals and schools experienced varying levels of damage. Livestock losses were recorded, especially in peri-urban areas.
- **Response:** WHO, UNICEF, WFP, UNFPA, and IOM were among the UN agencies involved in the response.
- **Coordination:** Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA), Ministry of Local Governance (MoLG), and OCHA coordinated humanitarian assistance in affected areas.



Southwest Flood Situation– September 2024

- **Impact:** Approximately 1,925 families were affected in Sebha city. Housing damages included 39% fully collapsed homes, 28% at risk of collapse, and 33% partially damaged.
- **Displacement:** Over 200 families were displaced from affected neighborhoods in Sebha and surrounding towns.

- **Incidents:** A road collapse was reported between Ubari and Al-Awainat. A drowning was recorded in Wanzrik area.
- **Sources:** Situation reported by national authorities and confirmed field updates from IOM and municipal councils.

Southwest Flood Situation – August 2024

- **Affected Regions:** Tahala, Ghat, Barkat, Murzuq, and Sebha.
- **Displacement:** Over 500 families displaced in Tahala; 107 families displaced in Ghat.
- **Infrastructure:** Heavy road damage, localized flooding, and extended power outages in affected towns.
- **Water Contamination:** Concerns over waterborne diseases due to damaged sanitation systems and water supply.
- **Humanitarian Response:** UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, IRC, and local NGOs provided emergency shelter, hygiene kits, clean water, and healthcare services. Coordination challenges noted among local and international actors.

Southeast Floods – Al Kufra & Rabiana – August 2024

- **Displacement:** Approximately 3,000 people displaced in Al Kufra, including 50 Sudanese refugee families whose collective shelter collapsed.
- **Health Facilities:** Atiya Al-Kasih Hospital in Al Kufra was flooded; 23 patients were evacuated to Al-Hawari Hospital in Benghazi.
- **Multi-sector Response:** UN agencies distributed food, NFIs, hygiene kits, and medicines. Refugees were relocated to temporary shelters including schools.
- **Protection Concerns:** Mixed populations in collective shelters raised concerns over protection and dignity, particularly for women and children.
- **Response:** UN agencies (UNHCR, WFP, UNFPA, WHO, UNICEF, IOM) provided coordinated assistance including CRIs, food rations, dignity kits, emergency medical supplies, and mobile medical teams.